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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN C. SPACKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. Case No. 6844 
! r ALTON J. CARSON, 






.................... _. _____ __ 
OI.'RIC, SUPREME COURT, UTAH 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH, 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in for Cache County. 
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1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALVIN C. SPACKMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
ALTON J. CARSON, 
Defendant and Appellant 
1 Case No. 6844 j 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is 25 years of age and a resident of 
Richmond, Utah. On 25th day of October, 1947, he was 
the owner of a Harley Davidson Motorcycle, and was an 
experienced motorcycle operator. (Tr. 83, 84.) About 
3:45 o'clock p. m. of said day, plaintiff was returning on 
his motorcycle from Logan City to his home in Richmond 
along U. S. Highway 91, which is an inter-state and 
National highway; The defendant's home is situated on 
the east side of said highway and about 1.2 miles south 
of Richmond. The highway at that point is straight and 
level, and runs about twenty degrees east of north. The 
weather was clear, and pavement dry. (Tr. 146.) The 
concrete pavement is 18 feet wide with a yellow center 
line, and with a six foot dirt shoulder on each side of 
the pavement. (Tr. 86, 87.) Defendant's 1~ ton truck 
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was parked about four feet east of the pavement on said 
highway in front of his home, facing north Tr. 88, 89, 90) 
and directly behind defendant's parked automobile. 
(Tr. 215.) 
The plaintiff was traveling about 45 miles per hour 
and about in the middle of the east lane, ( Tr. 145) and 
he first observed the truck when about 200 feet south 
of the same at which time the truck was motionless; (Tr. 
146) and as plaintiff approac~ed nearer and when about 
thirty feet south of place of collision, the defendant, with-
out giving a signal ( Tr. 96) drove his truck suddenly and 
directly onto the highway and immediately in front of the 
plaintiff. ( Tr. 89, 162.) The truck was traveling about ten 
miles per hour and was entering the pavement on an 
angle of about 45 degrees with the highway. (Tr. 163, 
157.) 
As soon as plaintiff saw the truck moving onto the 
pavement in front of him he immediately applied his 
brakes, ( Tr. 166) and turned his motorcycle to the left, 
endeavoring to avoid a collision, and at the time of im-
pact the front end of the truck had reached a point about 
on the center line of the highway, (Tr. 162, 170) and 
the motorcvcle collided with the truck at the rear end 
- ol 
of the left front fender and in front of left door of the 
cab. ( Tr. 95, 96.) The plaintiff and the motorcycle both · 
hurdled over the hood or front end of the truck; the motor-
cycle landing in the west lane and the plaintiff on the 
west shoulder of the highway, and about 15 or 20 feet 
northwest from point of impact. (Tr. 96, 97, 113, 167.) 
The defendant's truck immediately turned off into the 
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east barrow pit and stopped about 6 or 8 feet north, 
fron1 \Vhere plaintiff '\Vas lying on shoulder, and across 
the highway to the east side. (Tr. 97, 98.) 
There is very little, if any real dispute between the 
plaintiff and defendant on the foregoing facts. While 
the defendant testified that he gave a signal before he 
started his tn1ck for\vard, vet he also testified that he 
.I 
didn't look for traffic before he started, ( Tr. 248) and 
that he drove his tn1ck upon the pavement without stop-
ping or looking for traffic coming from the south. (Tr. 
248.) He testified that he looked straight ahead, (Tr. 
248) and he admitted that he did not see respondent or 
the motorcycle until after the collision. ( Tr. 169, 251.) 
The foregoing testimony clearly proves that the defend-
ant-absentmindedly drove his truck forward without giv-
ing a signal, or, without stopping before entering upon 
the pavement and without looking south to be sure that 
he could safely enter upon, or cross the highway. The 
fact that he didn't see the plaintiff before the collision 
clearly indicates that defendant did not look for traffic. 
The plaintiff ~estified that the collision occurred 
about on the center line of the highway. (Tr. 96.) The 
defendant practically agrees with the plaintiff on this 
fact, since defendant stated that the left front wheel of 
the truck was about 2 feet east of center line at time of 
collision. (Tr. 217.) And defendant admits that the 
plaintiff and the motorcycle hurdled over the front end 
of truck and the defendant landed on west shoulder of 
the highway and the motorcycle stopped in . the west 
lane. (Tr. 220.) The defendant could easily have been 
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mistaken as to the exact location of the collision, as he 
was sitting up in the cab, while the plaintiff was sitting 
on the motorcycle and nearer the pavement, and the 
plaintiff was aware of the impending accident and the 
defendant was not, ( Tr. 169) because he did not see the 
motorcycle until after it collided with the truck. ( Tr. 218.) 
ARGUMENT 
The only error appellant urges as a ground for re-
versal is that "the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
motion for a directed verdict in favor of appellant" and 
in support thereof on page 6 of his brief predicates two 
propositions: ( 1) There is no evidence appellant was negli-
gent, and ( 2) that the proximate cause of the accident 
was the negligence of the respondent in failing to keep 
a lookout for appellant's truck, and to act properly in 
accord with the knowledge this would have brought him. 
Under the facts, and the law applicable thereto, the 
effect of appellant's argument is an attempt on his part 
to entirely ignore the provisions of Section 57-7-132, and 
the puropse thereof. 
Section 57-7-132, provides: 
"No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, 
standing, or parked unless and until such movement 
can be made with reasonable saftey." 
The rule involved in the foregoing statute was cov-
ered by the Court's instructions Nos. 13 and 15, (Tr. 
56, 58.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
This statute has not been construed by this Court, 
but a companion statute, (Section 57-7-139) and one of 
similar import, was recently constn1ed by this Court in the 
case of Nielson v. ~lauchley, 202 P. 2d. 547, wherein the 
rule governing the duty of a motorist, about to enter a 
highway is laid down in the following language: 
"The true n1le is that, under the section of the 
Vehicle Code above quoted, it is made the duty of 
the driver of an automobile entering the highway 
from a private drive to look for approaching cars, 
and not to proceed if one is coming, unless, as a 
reasonably prudent and cautious person he believes, 
and has a right to believe, that he can pass in front 
of the other in safety.,, (Italics added.) 
These statutes both require that the motorist enter-
ing a through highway, either fron1 a standing position, 
or from a private road or driveway, shall look for and 
yield the right-of-way to all approaching vehicles on said 
highway. 
Appellant at pages 3 and 5 of his brief attempts to 
make much of the fact that he moved the truck back-
ward, then forward, etc., at a slow rate of speed before 
entering upon the highway and that the plaintiff should 
have seen him but did not - and that this testimony is 
uncontradicted. This statement is a strained and un-
reasonable interpretation of the testimony and unjustified. 
Nor is it accurate. It was contradicted. For example, res-
pondent testified, (Tr. 162): "I seen - I was only just a 
short distance when the truck 1noved out immediately and 
into the highway. 
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Q. Onto the highway? A. Yes. 
Q. And was that the time when you say you were 
about thirty feet south of it? A. Yes." 
And there are at least two sufficient answers to ap-
pellant's contention: ( 1) The jury by their verdict de-
cided not to believe this testimony. For instance, they 
could easily believe that if defendant made the man-
euvers he claims to have made, respondent would have 
passed him before he entered the highway, and there 
would have been no accident, and ( 2) even if defendant 
did so move his truck, this fact, under the statutes above 
cited and the rule laid down by this Court in Nielsen v. 
Mauchley, supra) was not a warning to respondent, acting 
reasonably, that appellant would continue and enter upon 
the highway until he could do so in safety. 
I. Defendants negligence was a proximate cause of 
accident. 
It is respectfully submitted by respondent that the 
preponderance if not the greater weight of the evidence, 
clearly shows that the proximate cause of the accident in 
this case resulted from the defendant's violation of the 
provisions of Section 57-7-132, as well as the foregoing 
rule laid down b:ythis Court in Nielsen v. Mauchley. 
supra. It is further submitted that the preponderance 
of the evidence in the case at bar, supports the conclusion 
that the appellant, without thinking and without warning, 
suddenly and abruptly drove his truck upon the highway, 
directly in front of and in the path of the respondent's 
motorcycle, and completely· barricaded the east lane of 
the high,vay, and so close in front of him that the re-
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spondent, within the space, and the time available could 
not by the exercise of reasonable care have possibly 
avoided colliding 'vith the appellant's truck. 
The appelllant in his attempt to show that plaintiff 
\\ras guilty of negligence, and that it was a proximate cause 
of the accident has cited the case of Conklin v. Walsh, 
193 Pac. 2d. 437 (Utah.) The appellant attempts to 
compare the position of the defendant Walsh in that case 
with that of the plaintiff in the instant case, because as 
he says in his brief on page 9 -
"While 200 feet back, he, Walsh, observed ave-
hicle approaching on his left and then failed to ob-
serve the approaching vehicle again until it was too 
late to avoid the collision.'' 
There is no evidence in the instant case that the 
defendant's truck was moving toward or upon the high-
way when the plaintiff was 200 feet south of the defend-
ant's truck. On the contrary, the evidence shows with-
out dispute that when the plaintiff was 200 feet south 
of the defendant's truck, it was then standing motionless 
on the shoulder of the highway, facing north; and al-
though the plaintiff was looking straight ahead, as he 
approached nearer the truck, he did not see it move to-
ward the highway until he was about SO feet south of 
the place of collision, at which time the defendant's tn1ck 
1noved onto the highWay in front of the plaintiff, who 
was then so near the truck that all he could humanly do 
was apply his brakes and turn to the left endeavoring to 
avoid a collision. It will thus be seen that there is not 
the remotest resemblence between the facts in the Conk-
lin case and the case at bar. 
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The appellant also cites a late Utah case, Mingus v. 
Olsson, 201 Pac. 2d. 495, which laid down the rule that 
"The duty to look has inherent in it the duty to see what 
is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it." Respondent 
has no quarrel with that rule. And under the facts in that 
case it was properly applied. 
A casual examination of the facts in that case will 
distinguish it from the facts in the case at bar. For ins-
tance, in that case the plaintiffs~ intestate, a pedestrian, 
accompanied by his wife, were walking easterly on the 
south side of West Minister AvenlJe, and when they ar-
rived at the intersection of said A venue with 13th East 
Street, the defendant was traveling south some distance 
north of said intersection with his headlights burning. 
The undisputed evidence in that case, in fact the inte-
state~s wife testified, that neither she nor her husband 
looked north to ascertain if an automobile was approach-
ing, therefore, in the Mingus case there was no dispute 
about the decedent~ s failure to look for cars approaching 
from the north, and the evidence seems to show without 
dispute that the decedent and his wife walked absent-
mindedly into the path of defendant's approaching car, 
and it must also be remembered that in that case the 
plaintiff's intestate and his wife were entering a through 
street, while in the case at bar the plaintiff was travel-
ing northerly on a through highway. 
Appellant cites Hickok v. Skinner, (Utah) 190 P. 2d 
514. In that case, the plaintiff was traveling north on 
West Temple Street and stopped for stop sign at 21st 
South, which street is an arterial highway. Plaintiff ad-
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mitted that he sa\v defendant coming westerly on 21st 
South about 400 to 500 feet east from the intersection. 
Plaintiff then proceeded to cross the intersection and was 
struck by defendant's car in the north lane of traffic. The 
plaintiff adn1itted that although he was aware of defend-
ant's car coming westerly, he nevertheless drove through 
the intersection without again looking to see where de-
fendant was. That case is not in point \vith case at bar 
for at least two good reasons: ( 1) Hickok, the plaintiff, 
entered an arterial highway, 21st South Street, and his 
right to do so was governe~y Section 57-7-138, U.C.A. 
1943, which required him to yield the right of way to cars 
approaching the intersection on arterial highways, under 
certain conditions and ( 2) he failed to keep his eye on 
Skinner, the defendant, although he was aware of Skin-
ner's presence on the highway. 
The evidence shows with very little, if any, dispute 
that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate 
cause of the accident. We have heretofore pointed out that 
the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff was traveli-
ing along the highway at a reasonable rate of speed, that 
he had the right-of-way and was looking ahead and as 
soon as the defendant started toward and upon the pave-
ment, the pla~tiff was then so close to the defendant that 
all plaintiff could do was apply the brakes and turn his 
motorcycle to the left in an attempt to avoid the accident. 
It thus definitely appears from the evidence that the plain-
tiff was operating his motorcycle in a careful and lawful 
manner; and the accident would not have occurred if 
the defendant, without looking and without warning, had 
not driven his truck onto the pavement, and thus barri-
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caded the highway so closely in front of the plaintiff that 
he was without any means of escape. 
We respectfully submit that the defendant was gros-
sly negligent and that his course of action in entering upon 
the pavement as aforesaid, was the proximate cause of 
this accident, as that rule is defined in a recent and well 
considered case decided by this Court in Hess v. Robin-
son, 163 P. 2d. 510: 
"To be a proximate cause of an injury it must 
be an efficient act of causation and separated from 
its effect by no other act of causation. There must 
be a causal connection between the act or omission 
and the subsequent injury. 'T~e law does not search 
for the remote agencies by which an injury is brought 
about or made possible, but holds the last conscious 
agent in producing it responsible therefor.' Miner v. 
McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138, 140, 21 L. R. A. 
N. S., 477. It is one that directly causes or contri-
butes directly to causing the result." (Italics added.) 
II. Case properly submitted to Jury to determine quest-
ions of fact. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff was traveling on the 
arterial highway and the defendant was required to yield 
right-of-way to plaintiff under Section 57-7-132 U.C.A. 
1943, and as soon as plaintiff observed the defend-
ant's truck entering upon the highway, he immed-
iately took action to avoid the collision, but he was 
"trapped" and, could not escape because of defendant's 
unlawful entry upon the highway. It will thus be seen 
that the factual situation, present in the case at bar, is en-
tirely different from the factual situation present in the 
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three Utah cases cited in appellant's brief, pages 9-11. The. 
plaintiff's evidence clearly showed that he acted as a pru-
dent n1otorist would act under the same circumstances, 
and the evidence also shows that the defendant failed to 
yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff and, therefon: it was 
clearly a case for the jury to decide from all the facts and 
circumstances in the case which party was at fault in 
bringing about a collision in this case. The trial court was 
well within its right in submitting this case to the jury. 
Therefore, the court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion for directed verdict. 
Had appellant followed the course as indicated by 
his exhibit No. 1, the accident would not have happened, 
because plaintiff would have had sufficient room to pass 
him, inasmuch as it appears from defendant's exhibit No. 
1, that the left front wheel of the truck only entered about 
half way over in the east lane of traffic. Thus leaving 
the plaintiff with ample room to pass. Moreover, it is 
admitted that the plaintiff's motorcycle collided with the 
rear end of the left front fender, so that, if the defendant's 
exhibit No. 1 is to be believed the plaintiff would have 
actually had to make a sharp tum to his left and then 
tum sharply back to his right in order to hit the truck on 
the angle shown by the injury to the fender. And like-
wise, it is difficult to perceive how the defendant would 
have landed over on the west shoulder of the highway had 
the collision taken place as shown by defendant's exhibit 
No. 1. 
There is an attempt on the part of appellant by his 
exhibit No. 1 to show that the accident did not happen 
on the center line of the pavement as plaintiff testified, 
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thus there is a conflict in the evidence which was resolved 
by the jury. There are also other conflicts· in the testimony 
which would necessarily have to be resolved by the jury, 
and not by the Court. 
This case comes squarely within the rule that where 
the facts are conflicting and reasonable minds may differ 
as to the facts and circumstances existing immediately 
prior to the collision, the following rule as laid down by 
this Court in the case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2d. 
510, is controlling. The language used by this Court is 
as follows: 
"As to what the circumstances were at the time 
plaintiff entered the intersection, and as to whether 
entering under such circumstances was an act from 
which a person of ordinary prudence and caution 
would have foreseen that some injury would likely 
result, are matters upon which reasonable minds may 
differ. As such they are properly for the jury. Prox-
imate cause and contributory negligence are ordi-
narily questions of fact for the jury to determine 
under all the circumstances. ~~~~~·Questions of neg-
ligence do not become questions of law for the court 
except where the facts are such that all reasonable 
men draw the same conclusions." 
CONCLUSION · 
The appellant's motion for a directed verdict was 
properly denied by the trial court. This appeal involves 
no question of law for the court, but only questions of fact 
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for the jury and, the jury by their verdict under proper 
instructions determined the issues in favor of plaintiff, 
and)- there is sufficient competent testimony to sup-
port their verdict. 
The trial court instructed the jury as requested by 
appellant, and he had a fair trial. In fact, the trial court 
was rather liberal with the appellant in over emphasizing 
the question of contributory negligence by giving five 
instructions all relating to this question. (Instructions 
3 to 7 inclusive, Tr. 46-50. ) The appellant now wants to 
try this case over again, but he has failed to show any 
reason why he should be granted such a right. 
For the foregoing reasons respondent respectfully 
submits that the verdict in this case should be sustained 
and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH, 
L. E. NELSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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